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Abstract 
 
The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions’ bargaining power on production and 
wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable 
intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers 
decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined 
endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or 
skilled) unions’ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the 
same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions’ bargaining power if the final goods 
production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has e.ects similar to an 
increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions. 
 
JEL Clasification Code: E24, J21, J31, J42, J51. 
Keywords: Union Power, Minimum Wage, Labor Supplies, Skills. 
 
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the unions’ bargaining power in economies
characterized by a labor market that is endogenously segmented into skilled and unskilled
workers. We show that, under certain conditions, the presence of unions may be beneficial
for the economy in the sense that they may induce higher production.
The eﬀects of unions in the economy have been widely analyzed both from a theoretical
and an empirical point of view. Empirical analysis has mainly centered on wage dispersion.
In this respect, the results seem to be conclusive. Among others, Freeman (1980, 1993)
and Card (1992) for the U.S. case, Lemieux (1998) for the Canadian case, and Bover,
Bentolila and Arellano (2000) for the Spanish case, find that union power reduces wage
dispersion. Theoretical studies have considered the impact of unions with other variables
of the economy, such as capital, unemployment or production. Grout (1984), in a partial
equilibrium analysis, finds that unions have a negative impact for the economy when wage
agreements are not binding. Likewise, Deveraux and Lockwood (1991), in an overlapping
generations general equilibrium approach, show that an increase in the unions’ bargaining
power raises wages and thus both savings of the young generation and capital. In contrast
with the last paper, which depends crucially on the assumption that the depreciation
rate is zero, de la Croix and Licandro (1995) find that the eﬀects of unions on capital
is ambiguous when uncertainty and irreversibility with regards to physical and human
capital and technology is introduced. Regarding the eﬀects on production, Dutt and Sen
(1997) show that in a demand constrained economy with imperfect competition, a rise in
the unions’ bargaining power increases the markup and may increase the real wage and
thus output and employment. In a diﬀerent setting, Palokangas (1996) finds that when the
engine of economic growth is with Research and Development activities, then the growth
rate increases with the union power since there is a transfer of skilled labor from the final
goods production to the R&D sector. Also, Ramos-Parreño and Sánchez-Losada (2002),
in a two sector overlapping generations economy with altruism and human capital, show
that the relationship between growth and unions’ influence depends on the interaction
between the technology in the human capital sector and the degree of unionization of the
economy. The eﬀect on unemployment has been studied by de la Croix (1993), who, in a
setting with wage envy externalities between unions, finds that unemployment increases
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with the unions’ bargaining power.
In this paper we construct a very stylized economy where a competitive final good is
produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, which are produced in a union-
ized competitive unskilled sector and a unionized competitive skilled sector. Potential
workers decide at their cost to become skilled or not and, thus, labor supplies are deter-
mined endogenously. In this setting, the relationship between the unskilled and the skilled
unions’ bargaining power is found to be crucial in specifying the eﬀects on the final goods
production of a change in one of the unions’ bargaining power. Any change in one of the
union’s bargaining power has two eﬀects: a scale eﬀect and a reallocation one. An increase
in the bargaining power of the union in some sector causes an increase in the wage of this
sector, which is transferred to the intermediate goods price. This has a negative eﬀect on
the demand for this input of the final goods firm and hence production decreases. This
is the scale eﬀect. Moreover, this increase in the unions’ bargaining power has a negative
eﬀect on the employment rate in this sector. As well, the expected wage in the aﬀected
sector decreases, making the other sector more attractive to potential workers because
of a change in both the expected wages and the opportunity cost of becoming skilled.
This leads to potential workers changing their qualification choice, resulting in a reallo-
cation of the labor supplies which then aﬀects the prices and may induce an increase in
the intermediate goods demands and, consequently, an increase in final production. The
importance of the reallocation eﬀect with respect to the scale eﬀect depends on the inter-
mediate goods “productivity”, the union powers and the costs associated with acquiring
skills.
An increase in production as a consequence of an increase in the bargaining power of
the unions in the unskilled sector leads to an increase in the total labor earnings. This is
not necessarily true when the increase in production is due to an increase in the skilled
unions’ bargaining power, since the reallocated labor earns a lower wage. This means that
if skilled unions cause final goods production to rise, this increase may become entirely
firm profits. As far as wage dispersion is concerned, we find that the unionized relative
wage (skilled over unskilled) is decreasing with the unskilled union power, as the evidence
suggests, and that it is increasing with the skilled union power. At the same time, the
unionized expected relative wage (expected skilled wage over expected unskilled wage) is
increasing with the unskilled union power and decreasing with the skilled union power.
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Government could aﬀect the influence of unions in diﬀerent ways, such as law changes
or higher coverage of unions. An alternative mechanism that has similar consequences to
an increase in the bargaining power of unskilled unions is the imposition of a minimum
wage in the economy.
Traditionally, minimum wages have been associated with lower aggregate labor de-
mand and therefore lower employment and welfare. Recently, this relationship has been
questioned and a positive eﬀect of a minimum wage on employment has been found to
appear in some models, as in Jones (1987), Chalkey (1991) or Rebitzer and Taylor (1995).
Other studies have centered on the connection between the minimum wage and skilled-
unskilled labor. In this respect, Flug and Galor (1986), in an open economy, find that a
minimum wage may increase the skilled to unskilled ratio of the economy and, therefore,
force the economy to produce skill intensive goods. Cahuc and Michel (1996), in an en-
dogenous growth through human capital accumulation economy, show that an increase in
the minimum wage raises both human capital accumulation and the endogenous growth
rate, while the minimum wage has negative eﬀects in case of exogenous growth. Cahuc,
Saint-Martin and Zylberberg (2001), in an unionized economy, show that the relation-
ship between labor demands and wages depends on the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor, and that a positive relation between the minimum wage and
unskilled labor employment may occur. The evidence for the eﬀects of minimum wages
on employment is not conclusive. Among others, Kaufman (1989) and Couch and Wit-
tenburg (2001) find that a minimum wage has a negative eﬀect on employment, Card and
Krueger (1995) and Dolado et al. (1996) find that the eﬀect on aggregate employment is
positive, and De Fraja (1999) shows that the eﬀects of changes in the minimum wage on
employment are limited.
In our setting, an increase in the minimum wage makes the skilled wage decrease
since a decrease in unskilled labor demand implicitly reduces skilled labor productivity.
Whereas unskilled labor employment decreases, skilled employment increases. Worthy
of note in this situation is that the expected unskilled wage decrease is higher than the
expected skilled wage decrease. This change in expected wages attracts potential workers
to change their qualification choice, resulting in a higher skilled labor supply and lower
unskilled one. As a result, if the qualification cost is not too high and the skilled labor
is suﬃciently “productive”, final goods production increases. These results substantiate
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Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Cahuc et al. (2001), since we find that there could be
positive eﬀects in an exogenous growth setting, although in our model a positive relation
between minimum wage and unskilled labor employment never occurs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the production
processes, labor supplies decisions and equilibrium for the competitive economy. In section
3 we analyze the eﬀects of the unions’ bargaining power in a unionized economy, while
in section 4 we focus on the eﬀects of a minimum wage legislation. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 The Competitive Economy
2.1 Production
There are two types of labor in the economy: unskilled and skilled. Unskilled labor l
is employed to produce the intermediate goods yl, while skilled labor h is employed to
produce the intermediate goods yh. These intermediate goods are used to produce final
goods in a perfectly competitive output market. Let pl and ph denote the respective
sectorial price indices and normalize the final goods price to 1. The production function
of a representative final goods firm is
Y = [φyρl + (1− φ)yρh]1/ρ , (1)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ < 1, which indicates that inputs are imperfect substitutes.
From the firm’s profit maximization, we get
yh
yl
=
"
pl
ph
Ã
1− φ
φ
!# 1
1−ρ
(2)
and
1 =
·
p
ρ
ρ−1
l φ
1
1−ρ + p
ρ
ρ−1
h (1− φ)
1
1−ρ
¸ρ−1
ρ
, (3)
where the first equation specifies the relative demand for intermediate goods, and the
second equation is the non profit condition.
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Intermediate unskilled and skilled goods are an aggregate of the output from a con-
tinuum of the industry firms, i.e., yl =
R 1
0 yidi and yh =
R 1
0 yjdj, where yi and yj are the
output of an individual intermediate unskilled and skilled goods firm, respectively, with
i, j ∈ [0, 1] .
The production function of an intermediate skilled goods firm j is given by yj = h
εh
j h
ε
h ,
where hj is the skilled labor employed and h is an externality due to the skilled labor,
which is equal to the average skilled labor employed in the economy (that may represent
research discoveries, new technologies,...).1,2 Given the specific production function con-
sidered, it is straightforward to show that εh and εh are the elasticities of revenue of h
and h, respectively, where it is assumed εh, εh ∈ (0, 1) and εh + εh = 1. This externality
induces constant returns to scale in the economy as a whole, while at the firm’s level there
are decreasing returns to scale and thus a surplus for the individual firms. This surplus is
necessary for the existence of local wage bargaining in a competitive environment. Oth-
erwise, firms have no incentive to enter into negotiations with a union and the monopoly
union is the only possible case.3
We assume the “right-to-manage”, so firms decide on the level of employment of skilled
labor to maximize profits, given the wage. Denoting the skilled labor wage by wh, the
optimal level of employment h for any firm satisfies
wh = phεhh
εh−1h
ε
h . (4)
Note that the labor elasticity of revenue is equal to its share in total revenue, i.e. εh =
whh/phyj.
The production function of an unskilled input firm i is given by yi = lεll
ε
l , where l is the
unskilled labor employed, l is an externality accruing from the aggregate unskilled labor,
1Hereinafter, we suppress the subindices of each firm, i.e. hj = h. The same applies for the unskilled
input firms.
2Other production functions only complicate the analysis. The results remain if the labor elasticity
of revenue is constant. Also, the introduction of capital does not vary the results if an open economy is
considered.
3All results of the paper except Proposition 3 are maintained under the assumption of no external-
ities and decreasing returns to scale in the intermediate goods firms technology. An alternative way of
formalizing the economy in such a way that similar results arise is to assume imperfect competition in
the intermediate goods market. However, introducing externalities simplifies the exposition of the paper.
In any case, in the next sections we explicitly comment how they aﬀect our results.
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and εl and εl are the elasticities of revenue of l and l, respectively, where εl, εl ∈ (0, 1) and
εl + εl = 1. Again, given the unskilled wage wl, the firms choose the level of employment
l satisfying
wl = plεll
εl−1l
ε
l . (5)
As before, the labor elasticity of revenue is equal to its share in total revenue, i.e. εl =
wll/plyi.
In order to contemplate situations where skilled labor is more “productive” than un-
skilled labor it is assumed throughout that εh > εl. This implies that the labor share of
the total revenue is higher in the skilled sector than in the unskilled one.
2.2 Labor Supplies
The acquisition of skills is costly and the ability to acquire these skills diﬀers among
agents. Education is a means of acquiring skills: not everybody must apply the same
eﬀort in order to obtain the same level of education. In this setting, both unskilled L and
skilledH labor supplies are endogenously determined by the choices made by the potential
workers, who are assumed to have perfect foresight. Their decisions must contemplate
the gains from becoming skilled against the alternative situation of remaining unskilled.
The reward from remaining unskilled or not acquiring skills is the unskilled expected
wage wll/L, where the employment rate of unskilled labor l/L (i.e., the firms’ demand over
the unskilled labor supply) represents the probability of finding a job. In order to become
a skilled worker, each individual bears a cost, which is assumed to be an opportunity cost
and therefore proportional to the expected unskilled wage cwll/L, where c > 0. Each
individual also has a personal ability, denoted by a, aﬀecting the cost of acquiring these
skills. We assume that this cost is inversely proportional to ability. Then, the reward
for being skilled is the expected wage that the skilled worker earns minus the acquisition
cost,
wh
h
H
− c
a
wl
l
L
, (6)
where the employment rate of skilled labor h/H (i.e., the firms’ demand over the skilled
labor supply) is the probability of finding a job in the skilled sector. The ability value
a∗ which makes the individual indiﬀerent between acquiring skills or being unskilled is
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simply the value that makes both rewards equal, i.e.,
a∗ =
c l
L
wh
wl
h
H
− l
L
. (7)
Clearly, an increase in the skilled employment rate or in the relative wage (skilled over un-
skilled wage), and a decrease in the cost of acquiring skills or in the unskilled employment
rate, all reduce the minimum level of ability required to acquire skills a∗.
We assume that there is a continuum of potential workers with measure one and that
a is uniformly distributed across them. Then, the unskilled labor supply is L = a∗ and the
skilled labor supply is H = 1− a∗, since lower personal ability implies higher opportunity
cost and thus a lower reward for being skilled. Substituting a∗ and H in (7) shows that
the proportion of workers choosing not to become skilled satisfies
wh
Ã
h
1− L
!
= wl
l
L
(1 +
c
L
). (8)
2.3 Equilibrium
Once the workers have decided either to become skilled or not, they inelastically oﬀer a
unit of labor each. Since there are no unions, sectorial wages are decided by the market
clearing condition. Note that, as all firms are equal, in equilibrium hj = h, yj = yh,
li = l and yi = yl must be satisfied. Also, notice that in a competitive equilibrium
h = h = 1 − L and l = l = L, since there is no unemployment. Using εl = 1 − εl,
εh = 1− εh and evaluating in equilibrium, conditions (4) and (5) become
ph =
wh
εh
, (9)
and
pl =
wl
εl
, (10)
that means that any change in the wage is compensated by a change in the intermediate
goods price.
Likewise, in equilibrium the equations (2) and (8) can be expressed as
ph = pl
Ã
1− φ
φ
!µ
1− L
L
¶ρ−1
, (11)
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wh = wl(1 +
c
L
). (12)
Combining (9), (10) and (11) we obtain
wh
εh
=
wl
εl
Ã
1− φ
φ
!µ
1− L
L
¶ρ−1
, (13)
which, divided by (12), implicitly yields the unskilled equilibrium labor supply L∗,Ã
1− φ
φ
!µ
εh
εl
¶
= (1 +
c
L∗
)
µ
1− L∗
L∗
¶1−ρ
. (14)
The right hand side of (14) is a decreasing function of L and thus solely defines the
equilibrium unskilled labor supply. Moreover, evaluating equation (1) in equilibrium and
using (14), the final goods production Y ∗ can be expressed as
Y ∗ = (1− L∗) (1− φ) 1ρ
1 + εh
εl
µ
L∗
1− L∗
¶
1³
1 + c
L∗
´
 1ρ , (15)
or
Y ∗ = L∗φ
1
ρ
·
1 +
εl
εh
µ
1− L∗
L∗
¶µ
1 +
c
L∗
¶¸ 1
ρ
. (16)
3 The Unionized Economy
3.1 Bargaining
Workers negotiate wages at the firm level. Both skilled and unskilled workers are rep-
resented by diﬀerent unions. Unions do not cooperate and they focus exclusively on
obtaining the highest possible wage, i.e., they disregard the employment consequences of
the negotiated wages. This behavior can be justified by the observation that unions tend
to be more interested in the welfare of insiders than outsiders.4
First, consider the negotiations in a typical skilled intermediate goods firm. As usual,
the Nash solution is assumed to arise as the outcome of the bargaining process. The
4Cahuc et al. (2001) model a labor market where a sole union represents all workers. However, this
union is only concerned about skilled workers.
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maximand of the union representing skilled workers in the Nash bargaining process is
Uh − U0h = wh − sh, (17)
where sh is the income of a skilled worker if the negotiation fails. Following Barth and
Zweimüller (1995), sh is the expected income that a skilled worker can get in the rest of
the economy, that is
sh =
h
H
Vh, (18)
where Vh is the average wage rate for skilled workers in all other firms.5
The maximand of the firm in the bargaining process is
πh − π0h = phhεhhεh − whh, (19)
since the firm’s disagreement payoﬀ π0h is zero.
Denoting the bargaining power of the skilled union and the firm by βh and (1 − βh)
respectively, with 0 < βh < 1, the wage wh resulting from the bargaining process is that
which maximises the Nash product
(Uh − U0h)βh · (πh − π0h)1−βh
subject to (4), which indicates the right-to-manage restriction. This yields
wh =
(1− βh) εh
(εh − βh)
sh. (20)
Note that the employment rate is positive if βh < εh, which is assumed throughout.
6
Otherwise, production is equal to zero because as the union is only concerned with the
wage, a higher power implies that the wage stated by the union is higher than the labor
productivity and therefore no firm would want to hire these workers.
5Note that we are assuming that a skilled worker cannot work as unskilled. Since the expected wage is
always higher in the skilled sector than in the unskilled, one can reinterpret this situation just considering
that skilled workers spend their time looking for a job in the skilled sector.
6All results of the paper are then conditioned to this inequality. Even if we consider how changes in
the unions bargaining power aﬀect the variables of the model, we always restrict the analysis to these
situations.
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By symmetry, in equilibrium all firms pay the same wage. Thus, Vh = wh and then
sh =
h
H
wh. Substituting this value into (20) the equilibrium skilled employment rate is
obtained as
h
H
=
(εh − βh)
(1− βh) εh
. (21)
Similarly, in a typical unskilled intermediate goods firm, the union representing un-
skilled labor seeks to maximize Ul − U0l = wl − sl, where sl = lLVl, and the firm
πl − π0l = pllεllεl − wll, since, again, its disagreement payoﬀ π0l is zero. From the Nash
bargaining process we obtain
wl =
(1− βl) εl
(εl − βl)
sl, (22)
where βl represents the bargaining power of the unskilled workers. Using, as before, that
Vl = wl is satisfied in equilibrium, the equilibrium unskilled employment rate is
l
L
=
(εl − βl)
(1− βl) εl
. (23)
In this case, the employment rate is positive whenever βl < εl.
The presence of unions results in both unskilled and skilled employment rates being
constant in each sector. This means that any change in the labor supply would be com-
pensated by a proportional change in the employed labor. Therefore, although the union
focuses exclusively on the wage, as a result of negotiations this wage is adjusted in order
to maintain the employment rate constant. Note that from (21) and (23), there is always
unemployment since εh and εl are smaller than one.
3.2 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section, labor supplies and the final goods production in the unionized economy
are considered.
From (2), using εh = 1− εh and evaluating in equilibrium, the following relation has
to be satisfied
ph = pl
Ã
1− φ
φ
!Ã
h
l
!ρ−1
. (24)
11
Substituting wh and wl from (4) and (5) into (8) and evaluating in equilibrium, we obtain
ph = pl
µ
1− L
L
¶
l
h
εl
εh
µ
1 +
c
L
¶
. (25)
Hence, combining (24) and (25), the relative labor demand is given byÃ
h
l
!ρ
=
Ã
φ
1− φ
!
εl
εh
µ
1− L
L
¶µ
1 +
c
L
¶
. (26)
Substituting h and l from (21) and (23) into (26) we have the unskilled labor supply Lu
of the unionized economy specified byÃ
1− φ
φ
!µ
εh
εl
¶1−ρ "(εh − βh) (1− βl)
(εl − βl) (1− βh)
#ρ
=
µ
1− Lu
Lu
¶1−ρ µ
1 +
c
Lu
¶
. (27)
Since the left hand side of the previous equation increases with βl and the right hand side
decreases with Lu, any increase in βl must involve a decrease in Lu. Likewise, an increase
in βh implies an increase in Lu. Thus, the next lemma follows.
Lemma 1 An increase in the unskilled (skilled) union power implies a decrease (increase)
in the unskilled labor supply, i.e. dL/dβl < 0 and dL/dβh > 0.
The existence of skilled unions increases the unskilled labor supply by lowering skilled
employment even though unskilled unions are present in the economy. The eﬀects of
unskilled unions are opposed to those generated by skilled unions, that is, the unskilled
labor supply is reduced as the unskilled unions’ bargaining power increases. The reason is
that an increase in the bargaining power of any union increases the wage and thus reduces
the employment rate in this sector. Moreover, the expected wage in the sector concerned
is also reduced. Consequently, the proportion of skilled and unskilled labor demands in
the economy changes, decreasing the labor supply in that sector. Therefore, any change
in union power produces a reallocation of the labor force. This aﬀects both wages and
intermediate goods prices and thus the demand for intermediate goods by the final goods
firm. Next, we analyze how these changes in the bargaining power of unions aﬀect the
final goods production.
Evaluating (1) in equilibrium and using (21), (23) and (26), we obtain the unionized
final goods production Yu as
12
Yu =
"
εh − βh
(1− βh) εh
#
(1− Lu) (1− φ)
1
ρ
1 + εh
εl
µ
Lu
1− Lu
¶
1³
1 + c
Lu
´
 1ρ , (28)
or
Yu =
"
εl − βl
(1− βl) εl
#
Luφ
1
ρ
·
1 +
εl
εh
µ
1− Lu
Lu
¶µ
1 +
c
Lu
¶¸ 1
ρ
. (29)
For some parameter values, an increase in the bargaining power of unions has positive
eﬀects on the final goods production of the economy. These results are made explicit in
the next two propositions.7
Proposition 2 There exist bc (ρ, εl, εh) and bφ (ρ, εl, εh, c,βl, βh) such that an increase in
the unskilled union power implies a higher final goods production whenever c < bc and
φ < bφ.
An increase in unskilled union power has two eﬀects: a scale eﬀect and a reallocation
eﬀect. There is a scale eﬀect since final goods firms reduce the demand for the unskilled
intermediate goods, because the increase in the unskilled wage produces an increase in
its price. As a consequence, production decreases. In addition, there is a change in ex-
pected wages which makes individuals change their qualification choice, resulting in a
reallocation of the labor supplies (higher skilled labor supply and lower unskilled supply).
This reallocation eﬀect leads to a decrease in the price of the skilled intermediate goods
and hence the final goods firm increases the demand for the skilled intermediate goods
which may induce production to increase. The importance of these eﬀects depends on the
intermediate goods “productivity”, the unions’ bargaining power and the cost parameter.
Moreover, raising unemployment may increase final goods production when skilled inter-
mediate goods are relatively more productive than unskilled ones (φ smaller than some
critical value bφ) In such a case, the reallocation eﬀect is stronger on final production
than the scale eﬀect; this is because the opportunity cost to qualify supported by the
individuals is relatively small and the “eﬀective” marginal product added (included the
unemployed individuals) by the new skilled workers is higher than the unskilled marginal
product loss.
7All the proofs of the paper are relegated to the Appendix.
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Note that, by the continuity of the eﬀects of the unions’ bargaining power (when
βh = βl = 0 we are in the competitive scenario), if φ < bφ then the final goods production is
higher in the unionized economy than in the competitive economy. Also note that critical
unskilled labor productivity bφ depends both on unskilled and skilled unions’ bargaining
power, which means that the significance of the reallocation eﬀect depends on the unions
relative bargaining power. Moreover, bφ is decreasing in βh and increasing in βl. Therefore,
a higher skilled union power implies that it is less plausible that an increase in the unskilled
unions’ bargaining power makes final goods production to increase.
A higher unskilled wage reduces the opportunity cost of becoming skilled by decreas-
ing the unskilled expected wage. In some sense, this means that the restriction of the
economy due to the cost of qualification diminishes and a better allocation of labor sup-
plies is attained. This eﬀect is only present when the expected unskilled wage decreases.
Externalities do not play a crucial role for this result. However, the presence of external-
ities, which imply a diﬀerence between private productivity and “social” productivity, is
important when considering the eﬀects on production of an increase in the skilled unions’
bargaining power. In fact, an important aspect of our assumption is that the wage re-
ceived by the workers does not reflect their productivity in the economy. Thus, under
these circumstances, even by restricting the mobility of potential workers (induced by an
increase in βh), the reallocation of the labor force may have positive eﬀects on the final
goods production, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3 There exist ec (ρ, εl, εh) and eφ (ρ, εl, εh, c,βl, βh) such that an increase in
the skilled union power implies a higher final goods production whenever c < ec and φ > eφ.
The positive eﬀects on production of an increase in the bargaining power of the un-
skilled union has other eﬀects on the economy: unskilled unemployment, unskilled ex-
pected wage and unskilled labor earnings decrease as wl increases. However, some workers
who previously did not acquire skills change their minds and become part of the skilled
labor supply. Thus, the eﬀects on the total labor earnings TLE = wll+whh are not nec-
essarily negative. The next proposition shows that total labor earnings increase whenever
final production increases as a result of an increase in the bargaining power of unskilled
unions.
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Proposition 4 If c < bc and φ < bφ, then an increase in the unskilled union power implies
higher total labor earnings.
An increase in the final goods production has positive eﬀects on total labor earnings.
Although total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions’ bargaining power, we
can say nothing when the increase in production is due to stronger skilled unions, since
the reallocated labor earns a lower wage. This means that if skilled unions cause final
goods production to rise, this increase may become entirely profits.
Regarding the relative wages, the next propositions show that even though the ex-
pected relative wages W = (whh/H)/ (wll/L) increase as the bargaining power of un-
skilled unions increase, relative wages ω = wh/wl move in the opposite direction.
Proposition 5 The relative wage is decreasing (increasing) with the unskilled (skilled)
union power.
Proposition 6 The expected relative wage is increasing (decreasing) with the unskilled
(skilled) union power.
Although the relative wage decreases whenever the unskilled union power increases, the
expected relative wage increases. This behavior, which may seem “myopic”, is exclusively
due to the fact that unions concentrate solely on wages.
4 Minimum Wage Legislation
There may be alternative ways for a government to change the influence of unions in the
economy. In this section, a specific policy consisting of imposing a minimum wage for
the economy is considered. This policy has similar eﬀects to an increase in the unskilled
unions’ bargaining power. Hence, under certain circumstances minimum wage legislation
has positive eﬀects on the final production of the economy.
Consider the case where the government fixes a minimum wage w higher than the
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unskilled wage of the previous section wl.8 Let us also assume that w is lower than the
skilled wage, otherwise skilled unions would have no eﬀect. In this situation, the eﬀects
of the unskilled unions disappear and therefore the analysis can be reduced to that of
an economy where just the skilled unions are present. Labor supplies and final goods
production will now be a function of the minimum wage imposed by a government in the
economy.
Substituting wl by w, using εl = 1 − εl and evaluating in equilibrium, equation (5)
becomes
pl =
w
εl
. (30)
From (2), using εh = 1− εh and evaluating in equilibrium, we have
ph = pl
Ã
1− φ
φ
!Ã
h
l
!ρ−1
. (31)
Substituting wh and wl from (4) and (5) into (8), we obtain
ph = pl
µ
1− L
L
¶
l
h
εl
εh
µ
1 +
c
L
¶
. (32)
Combining (31) and (32) we obtain the relative labor demands as a function of unskilled
labor supply,
h
l
=
"Ã
φ
1− φ
!
εl
εh
µ
1− L
L
¶µ
1 +
c
L
¶# 1ρ
. (33)
From (30), (31) and (33) the skilled intermediate goods price is obtained as a function of
the minimum wage,
ph =
w
εl
·
εl
εh
µ
1− L
L
¶µ
1 +
c
L
¶¸ ρ−1
ρ
Ã
φ
1− φ
! 1
ρ
. (34)
The unskilled labor supply L is implicitly obtained from (3), substituting both prices from
(30) and (34),
1 =
w
φ
1
ρ
ε ρ1−ρl + ε
1
1−ρ
l
εh
Ã
1− L
L
!µ
1 +
c
L
¶
ρ−1
ρ
. (35)
8In order to find the wage settled by the Nash bargaining solution, we have to include the restriction
that the bargained wage must be at least the minimum wage. It is straightforward to show that this
restriction is always binding and thus this minimum wage would be the negotiated wage.
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It is straightforward to prove the following result.
Lemma 7 An increase in the minimum wage implies:
(a) higher unskilled (lower skilled) intermediate goods price.
(b) lower unskilled (higher skilled) labor supply, and
(c) lower unskilled (higher skilled) labor demand.
The imposition of a minimum wage has similar eﬀects to the introduction of unions in
the unskilled sector: it induces unemployment in the unskilled labor market and conse-
quently a reallocation of the labor force. Hence, as in the previous section, the reallocation
eﬀect may be high enough so that the imposition of a minimum wage has a positive impact
on the final goods production.
Evaluating (1) in equilibrium and using (21), (33) and (35) we obtain the final goods
production Y ,
Y =
"
εh − βh
(1− βh) εh
#
(1− L) (1− φ) 1ρ
1 + εh
εl
Ã
L
1− L
!
1³
1 + c
L
´
 1ρ . (36)
Noting that this expression coincides with (28), the next proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 8 There exist bc (ρ, εl, εh) and φ (ρ, εl, εh, c, w) such that an increase in the
minimum wage implies a higher final goods production whenever c < bc and φ < φ.
Note that, by continuity, if φ < φ then the final goods production is higher in the
economy with minimum wage legislation than in the competitive economy. Also note
that φ increases with w and now φ does not depend on the skilled unions’ bargaining
power. In this way, since the significance of the reallocation eﬀect does not depend on
the unions’ influence, the minimum wage has stronger eﬀects than those produced by an
increase in the unskilled unions’ bargaining power.
Increases in final goods production as a consequence of an increase in the minimum
wage have positive eﬀects on the total labor earnings TLE = wl+whh. Thus, the increase
in labor earnings in the skilled sector compensates the reduction of the labor earnings in
the unskilled sector.
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Proposition 9 If c < bc and φ < φ, then an increase in the minimum wage implies higher
total labor earnings wl + whh.
The eﬀects of a minimum wage legislation in the economy are similar to those of an
increase in unskilled bargaining power. There is a scale eﬀect that reduces production
and a reallocation eﬀect that increases production. When the last eﬀect dominates the
first, an increase in the minimum wage is beneficial for the economy. Although we are
in the case when final goods production increases, a higher minimum wage may imply
higher unemployment. Thus, we cannot claim that higher final goods production implies
higher welfare in the economy, since some agents of the economy may be excluded from
these gains.
5 Final Remarks
One of the aspects of the model which is important for our results is the endogeneity of
the labor supplies. There is an opportunity cost to becoming skilled that restricts the
mobility of potential workers to become part of the skilled labor supply.
The reallocation of labor supplies has been shown to be the key eﬀect in order to
obtain a positive relationship between unions’ influence and final production. Changing
the bargaining power of the unions or the imposition of a minimum wage are tools to
adjust labor supplies in the economy in order to correct the ineﬃcient assignment caused
by the existence of costs associated with the acquisition of skills. In this respect, it must
be emphasized that minimum wage legislation is diﬀerent from a public policy designed
to directly reduce the costs of acquiring skills. Minimum wage legislation reduces the
opportunity cost of becoming skilled by reducing the expected wage in the unskilled sector.
However, subsidizing potential workers in order to increase the skilled labor supply will
not reduce such costs, which need to be supported by agents of the economy.
The results of the paper are enhanced if considering a positive relationship between the
total factor productivity A
³
h
´
(assumed here to be one) and the average skilled employed
labor, i.e. Y = A(h) [φyρl + (1− φ)yρh]1/ρ where A0 > 0 and A00 < 0 (according to Coe and
Helpman, 1995) In this case, the reallocation eﬀect would be greater only in the cases
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where the unskilled labor supply decreases. The total quantity depends on the degree of
concavity of the total factor productivity.
The introduction of monopolistic competition would enable an important eﬀect of the
minimum wage to be shown. Although monopolistic competition restricts labor mobility
and skilled labor is lower than in perfect competition, as emphasizes Tse (2000), the
existence of a minimum wage is revealed as an important mechanism to partially break
this labor mobility restriction.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Since dYu/dβl = (dYu/dL) · (dL/dβl) and we know, by Lemma 1 that dL/dβl < 0, we
have to prove that dYu/dL < 0.
From (28)9, the sign of the derivative of the final goods production with respect to the
unskilled labor supply is
sign
dYu
dL
= sign
n
L3ρ (εl − εh) + L2 (ρεl (2c− 1) + εh [1− c (1 + ρ)])
+Lc [ρεl(c− 2) + 2εh]− ρεlc2 = g(L) + f(L)
o
.
Let
f (L) = L2 (ρεl (2c− 1) + εh [1− c (1 + ρ)]) + Lc [ρεl(c− 2) + 2εh]− ρεlc2
and
g(L) = L3ρ (εl − εh) .
Since sign(dYu/dL) = sign {g(L) + f(L)} ,where g (L) < 0 for any L ∈ (0, 1), sign(dYu/dL) <
0 will occur whenever f(L) < 0.
The solution to f(L) = 0 is
bL = c [ρεl(2− c)− 2εh]
2 (ρεl (2c− 1) + εh [1− c (1 + ρ)])±
±
q
c2 [ρεl(2− c)− 2εh]2 + 4ρεlc2 (ρεl (2c− 1) + εh [1− c (1 + ρ)])
2 (ρεl (2c− 1) + εh [1− c (1 + ρ)]) . (A.1)
If ρεl (2c− 1) + εh [1− c (1 + ρ)] > 0, then there is a unique positive real solution, that
with positive sign. This happens when
c < bc (ρ, εl, εh) = εh − ρεl
εh (1 + ρ)− 2ρεl =
εh − ρεl
εh − ρεl + ρ (εh − εl) .
9We use (28) instead of (29) since there is no βl in (28).
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It has been shown that sign(dYu/dL) < 0 ∀L ∈ (0, bL). Hence, if Lu < bL the proposition
holds. As d[(1 + c
L
)
³
1−L
L
´1−ρ
]/dL < 0, from (27) it is immediately shown that Lu < bL is
satisfied when
(1 +
cbL)
Ã
1− bLbL
!1−ρ
<
Ã
1− φ
φ
!µ
εh
εl
¶1−ρ "(εh − βh) (1− βl)
(εl − βl) (1− βh)
#ρ
and thus
φ < bφ (ρ, εl, εh, c,βl, βh) = 1/
1 + (1 + cbL)
Ã
1− bLbL
!1−ρ µ
εl
εh
¶1−ρ " (εl − βl) (1− βh)
(εh − βh) (1− βl)
#ρ .
Proof of Proposition 3
Since dYu/dβh = (dYu/dL) · (dL/dβh) and we know that dL/dβh > 0, we have to
prove that dYu/dL > 0.
From (29)10, the sign of the derivative of the final goods production with respect to
the unskilled labor supply is:
sign
dYu
dL
= sign
n
L2ρ (εh − εl)− Lεl (1− c) (1− ρ)− cεl (2− ρ)
o
.
Direct computations show that sign (dYu/dL) = 0 when
eL = εl (1− c) (1− ρ) +
q
ε2l (1− c)2 (1− ρ)2 + 4ρ (εh − εl) cεl (2− ρ)
2ρ (εh − εl) . (A.2)
Moreover, sign (dYu/dL) > 0 for any L > eL.
In order that eL ∈ (0, 1), a suﬃcient condition is that c < ec (ρ, εl, εh) = (ρεh − εl)/εl,
since this condition ensures that (dYu/dL)|L=1 > 0. Now, we are done if we show thateL < Lu.
As d[(1 + c
L
)
³
1−L
L
´1−ρ
]/dL < 0, from (27) we know that eL < Lu whenever
(1 +
ceL)
Ã
1− eLeL
!1−ρ
>
Ã
1− φ
φ
!µ
εh
εl
¶1−ρ "(εh − βh) (1− βl)
(εl − βl) (1− βh)
#ρ
,
10We use (29) instead of (28) since there is no βh in (29).
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which happens if
φ > eφ (ρ, εl, εh, c,βl, βh) = 1/
1 + (1 + ceL)
Ã
1− eLeL
!1−ρ µ
εl
εh
¶1−ρ " (εl − βl) (1− βh)
(εh − βh) (1− βl)
#ρ .
Proof of Proposition 4
Since Yu is produced competitively, using (9) and (10), we know that
Yu = pll + phh =
wl
εl
l +
wh
εh
h. (A.3)
Assuming that dYu/dβl = (dYu/dL) · (dL/dβl) > 0, we know that dL/dβl < 0, which
implies that wll/L has to decrease, otherwise L would not decrease. Thus, wll must also
decrease when βl increases, which implies that, from (A.3), whh must increase with βl
even though wh decreases.
Using (A.3), the total labor earnings TLE = wll + whh becomes
TLE = εlYu +
·
1− εl
εh
¸
whh, (A.4)
from where the derivative of TLE with respect to βl is
dTLE
dβl
= εl
dYu
dβl
+
·
1− εl
εh
¸
d (whh)
dβl
, (A.5)
which is positive since εl < εh.
Proof of Proposition 5
Combining (9), (10) and (24), and denoting the unionized relative wage as ω, we have
h
l
=
Ã
ω
εl
εh
φ
1− φ
! 1
ρ−1
, (A.6)
which combined with (26) gives
ω =
Ã
εh
εl
1− φ
φ
! 1
ρ
"Ã
1− eLeL
!µ
1 +
ceL
¶# ρ−1ρ
. (A.7)
Since d
h³
1−L
L
´ ³
1 + c
L
´i
/dL < 0, the proposition follows from Lemma 1.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Denoting the unionized expected relative wage by W and using (8), we have
W =
µ
1 +
c
Lu
¶
, (A.8)
and, hence, the relative expected wage decreases with L. The proposition follows by
Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 8
Using Lemma 7, the proof is the same as Proposition 2 but now, from (35), since
d
·µ
1− L
L
¶µ
1 +
c
L
¶¸
/dL < 0,
we know that if bL > L then
(1 +
cbL)
Ã
1− bLbL
!
<
w ρ1−ρ
φ
1
1−ρ
− ε
ρ
1−ρ
l

 εh
ε
1
1−ρ
l
 .
This happens whenever
φ < φ (ρ, εl, εh, c, w) = w
ρ/
ε ρ1−ρl + ε
1
1−ρ
l
εh
(1 +
cbL)
Ã
1− bLbL
!
1−ρ
.
Proof of Proposition 9
The proof is the same as Proposition 4 but replacing βl with w.
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